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Auditory imagery can represent many aspects of music, such as the starting pitches of a tune or the instrument that
typically plays it. In this paper, I concentrate on more dynamic, or time-sensitive aspects of musical imagery, as
demonstrated in two recently published studies. The first was a behavioral study that examined the ability to make
emotional judgments about both heard and imagined music in real time. The second was a neuroimaging study
on the neural correlates of anticipating an upcoming tune, after hearing a cue tune. That study found activation of
several sequence-learning brain areas, some of which varied with the vividness of the anticipated musical memory.
Both studies speak to the ways in which musical imagery allows us to judge temporally changing aspects of the
represented musical experience. These judgments can be quite precise, despite the complexity of generating the rich
internal representations of imagery.
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Introduction
The introduction to this symposium referred to
some of the characteristics of mental imagery as
memory representations. People report these experiences as capturing perceptual aspects of the event
or object, but in addition to the phenomenology,
numerous reports suggest that people can make accurate decisions about objects or experiences that
are only imagined.1,2 Although auditory imagery
is studied less often than visual, people commonly
claim that they can recollect music in such a way
as to simulate the actual hearing of the tune. For
instance, they can reproduce timing and pitch relationships as well as evoke the sound qualities of
musical instruments (reviewed in Ref. 3).
The relationship between heard and imagined
sounds is of interest for both theoretical and applied reasons. The theoretical interest lies in the
ways in which mental representation both preserves
but also changes experience. Memory is a dynamic
process, and memory researchers have long since
abandoned thinking of memory as an actual audio or video recorder. Not even “flashbulb” memories are veridical,4 and many psychologists caution

against the reification of eyewitness testimony in
legal systems.5 However, as noted previously, the
extent to which imagery representations maintain
aspects of experience that are not easily verbalizable
or even obviously codable suggests dissociations between the content and labeling of memories. For
instance, I tested people’s abilities to reproduce the
opening pitch of familiar songs, like “Happy Birthday.” Although people differed in what pitch they
chose, individuals were quite reliable in reproducing or choosing the same opening pitch for the tune
on two occasions several days apart.6 But none of
these people had absolute pitch ability; that is, none
could name the notes they were selecting, thus they
apparently were accessing a perceptual code.
Understanding auditory imagery is also useful in
several applied domains. Consider mental practice.
Musicians can suffer from crippling dystonias or
other medical conditions that can shorten a career.7
Relieving some of the motor stress by engaging in
mental practice (which involves both auditory and
motor imagery) could help alleviate some of these
concerns, and indeed mental practice is recommended for even healthy musicians or athletes when
physical practice is not practical. Knowing how
doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06442.x
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imagery processes work could lead to recommendations about how to implement these strategies,
as well as offering guidance to teachers for students
who have more and less vivid imagery.8 In addition,
the emerging field of neural prosthetics could benefit from understanding the neural underpinnings of
these vivid mental representations.9
My focus in this symposium was on two aspects
of auditory imagery that could be considered dynamic in the sense that the imagery representation
is required to be updated continuously to serve the
purpose at hand. I use this term to contrast with
the more static representations required in some of
my previous auditory imagery studies. For instance,
in the study on mental pitches mentioned earlier,6
the pitch selection does not require any processing
past the initial memory retrieval. Likewise, comparing the sound of imagined musical instruments
requires a memory retrieval of the sound of a violin or saxophone, and maintenance long enough
to generate a similarity rating, but no additional
operations.10 However, to accomplish a wider variety of tasks, it is likely we use dynamic imagery
processes to track time-varying information, make
novel or creative judgments, generate predictions,
or to represent multiple aspects of information
simultaneously.
I will illustrate dynamic auditory imagery processes with two studies that I was recently involved
with. In the first case, Lucas, Schubert, and I11 examined how well people could extract emotional
judgments of music in real time as they listened to,
and then imagined, a familiar piece of music. In
this case, even the perceptual judgment is dynamic
in that listeners must monitor the piece as well as
make a corresponding judgment in continuous, real
time. Dynamic imagery processes are even more important when the piece is being generated internally.
In the second case, I will describe a study carried
out in conjunction with Leaver and Rauschecker12
that looked at people’s ability to predict an upcoming melody based on having heard a melody previously associated with it. We call this “anticipatory
imagery,” in that the imagery is evoked only in response to the cue, but then must be retrieved in a
prospective manner, as the second melody, in this
case, is not actually played. The analogy from real
life would be anticipating the next track on one’s
favorite album or the next movement in a familiar
symphony as the previous segment ends. In fact, the
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first experiment in that paper used favorite CDs as
stimuli. However, I was only involved in the second
study that used paired associate learning of tunes, so
I will be describing that one. And I will be making a
link between these, as it is entirely possible that the
tracking displayed in the emotion judgments was
facilitated by anticipation.
During talks, I sometimes ask the audience if
they ever deliberately imagine music so as to regulate their moods; I usually get wide agreement with
this statement. Even persistent musical memories, or
“earworms,” seem to consist of preferred and pleasant music.13 So it would not be surprising if people
could extract emotional judgments from imagined
music, at least on a global basis. What was less evident to us was whether emotional judgments could
be made in real time as the music was actually proceeding (either real or imagined). Some preliminary
evidence by Schubert et al.14 suggested a mixed answer. They asked a pianist to listen to a recording
of himself and make continuous judgments of valence and arousal in the piece. He then did the same
thing as he imagined the piece. The two response
profiles were similar, but the pianist began lagging
in the responses to the imagined relative to the
heard piece. This is consistent with imagery being a
fairly expensive cognitive process in that it requires
full consciousness and responses in typical mental imagery experiments are often rather slow compared to other kinds of tasks. However, we did not
know if these results would generalize beyond a case
study.
We therefore asked undergraduate students to
participate in two tracking studies. We tested musicians (with at least 8 years of private instrument
playing, averaging about 10.5 years) partly to insure that our participants would have the fine motor control needed for continuous response, but also
because of the music we used. After considerable discussion, we decided that classical music would be a
good genre to test because we needed pieces that varied on the selected dimensions of valence, arousal,
and emotionality over the time span of about one
minute. We decided that music from genres more
familiar to nonmusicians, such as pop, rock, and
movie scores, tend not to vary as much over short
durations. Furthermore, we needed the pieces to
be highly familiar to our listeners for the imagery
condition, which again pointed to students with extensive musical training.
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Figure 1. Mean sounded and imagined time-series responses. (A) Mean arousal response for Beethoven, B; Mozart, M; and
Tchaikovsky, T. (B) Mean valence response for Beethoven, B; Mozart, M; and Tchaikovsky, T. Figure reprinted with permission
from Ref. 11.

We selected approximately the first minute of
Beethoven’s Symphony no. 5 in C minor,” op.
67, Tchaikovsky’s “Waltz of the Flowers” from the
Nutcracker Suite, op. 71, and the “Allegro” from
Mozart’s Serenade in G, K. 525 (Eine Kleine Nachtmusik). These were very familiar to our participant pool, had the requisite changes in emotional
characteristics in their opening sections, and were
rather different from each other. For instance, the
Beethoven piece was in a minor key and the others
in major. [The figures refer to these pieces by the
first letter of the composers: B, T, and M.]
We trained the participants to use a continuous
response recorder. As the piece played (or as they
imagined it), they moved a mouse on a display;
mouse positions were recorded twice per second.
In the first study, the task was to track valence
on the x-axis simultaneously with arousal on the
y-axis. Valence was explained as the range of negative to positive emotion and arousal as the range
of sleepy to excited emotion. Experiment 2 used
the single dimension of emotionality (in the range
of high to low). Several trials of practice preceded
the real trials. In the sounded condition, the piece
was played over speakers. In the imagined condition, the participants heard the first few notes of the
to-be-imagined piece and also could refer to a musical score. We analyzed data from 17 participants
in experiment 1, and 11 participants (4 from the
previous study) in experiment 2, but I will discuss
the results together. We also gave participants a tapping synchronization task, wherein they heard two
measures of an isochronous beat at 160 bpm, then
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had to keep the beat steady without the cue for 40
measures.
Figures 1 and 2 show the averaged response profiles for the three dimensions: the solid line indicates
the mouse position over time in the sounded condition and the dashed line in the imagined condition.
As is evident, the response profiles on average were
very similar in both conditions on all three dimensions, both in pattern (the same peaks and valleys)
and timing. Quantitative analysis showed that the
two profiles were highly correlated in most participants. A cross-correlation function analysis allowed
us to determine the lead or lag at which the highest
profile correlations were obtained. We found that
depending on the dimension, 85–100% of the analysis showed significant correlation at some lead or
lag; and the modal lead–lag was 0 samples. That is,
most people most of the time tracked the emotional
profile similarly, in both pattern and timing, in the
sounded and imagined conditions. The small leads
and lags shown by some people in some conditions
were actually within the small error range on the
tapping synchronization task. We also related many
of the peaks and valleys in the profiles to predesignated “turning points” in the music. For instance,
we predicted an increase in arousal when loudness
increased in the music. Over the eight identified
turning points across the three pieces, 84% of the
participants responded in the predicted way in their
tracking responses.
Thus, we concluded that musicians, at least, could
indeed make temporally fine-grained judgments. In
addition, the emotional message of music can be
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Figure 2. Mean emotionality response for Beethoven, B;
Mozart, M; and Tchaikovsky, T. Figure reprinted with permission from Ref. 11.

decoded, and presumably enjoyed in real time, even
in a mental representation. In that context, it is interesting to hear the words of Romel Joseph, a violinist
buried in the rubble of his collapsed music school for
18 hours before being rescued from the 2010 Haiti
earthquake. He later related how running through
familiar pieces in his mind helped him cope: “For
example, if I perform the Franck sonata, which is
[sic] 35 minutes long in my honors recital at Juilliard, then I would bring myself to that time. That
allows me . . . to mentally take myself out of the
space where I was. . .”15
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In this study, we were somewhat surprised that
the tracking in the imagined condition did not slow
down. Although carried out before the one just described, the other study I am using to illustrate dynamic auditory imagery could help explain the outcome. Perhaps the participants were anticipating
the notes in the imagined music, which counteracted what would otherwise have been a slowdown
in response because of the exigencies of generating
the auditory image.
As mentioned earlier, Leaver, Rauschecker, and I
built on a prior study in Rauschecker’s lab that examined neural correlates of anticipation of the next
track in familiar CDs.12 To reduce individual differences and to gain more experimental control, we
taught participants seven otherwise unrelated pairs
of unfamiliar but melodious tunes. The training session involved repeated study of a pair, with the goal
that when presented with the first member of the
pair, everyone could conjure up the image of the
second member of the pair. The scanning session
involved some additional training before entering
the fMRI scanner, and after the first run, we asked
them to overtrain by hearing the pairs for about 10
additional minutes. We tested 10 people who had a
minimum of two years of musical training (averaging about 6.5 years).
Although in the scanner, trials were of three types:
silent baseline, anticipatory imagery trials in which

Figure 3. (A) Significant activation associated with anticipatory imagery (AS > NS). Areas include cerebellum, globus pallidus/putamen (GP/Pu), thalamus, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA), and SMA proper.
(B) Sagittal view of medial frontal activation. Dotted line indicates Talairach coordinate axis, y = 0, separates pre-SMA and SMA
proper. (C) ROI analysis reveals percentage signal change differences in the AS conditions between run 1 (shaded) and run 2 (white)
∗
( P < 0.05). ROIs were defined by analysis shown in A. Error bars indicate SEM. Figure reprinted with permission from Ref. 12.
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Figure 4. (A) Areas for which BOLD signal is correlated with vividness rating in the familiar silence condition (GP/Pu, inferior
frontal gyrus, ventral premotor cortex (IFG/vPMC)). (B, C) Graphs show correlations between percentage signal change and
vividness ratings for ROIs resulting from the parametrically weighted GLM analysis in A. Figure reprinted with permission from
Ref. 12.

the first member of a learned melody pair was presented and people were asked to imagine the associated tune, and nonanticipatory trials. On these
trials, a novel tune was presented so that participants
could not imagine any associated tune. The acquisition of the fMRI data occurred in the silence after the
tune had been presented. The silence after a learned
tune ought to have engendered anticipation of the
next tune, hence we called these anticipatory silences
(AS). In these trials, we asked people to rate the
vividness of their imagery for the anticipated tune,
on a 1 (no image) to 5 (very vivid) scale. The silence
after a novel tune should not have engendered any
particular auditory imagery, hence nonanticipatory
silence (NS). For details of the scanning parameters
and analyses, see Ref. 12.
Figure 3 shows the contrast between AS and NS
trials. A number of brain areas were more active in
the anticipatory response, and of particular interest
were several areas normally associated with motor
sequence learning, such as the supplementary motor
areas (SMA and pre-SMA) and the globus pallidus
and putamen in the basal ganglia. These two areas showed decreased signal after overtraining, as
shown on the right side of the figure. Figure 4 shows
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two brain areas where activity in AS trials was directly correlated with the vividness ratings: the basal
ganglia areas just mentioned and a ventral premotor area. As seen in the graphs, correlations were
strongly positive and even linear in the second run
(correlations in the first run were positive but not
significantly so). That is, for every increase in vividness ratings, a proportional increase only in these
two areas occurred in the hemodynamic response
of AS trials.
This experiment showed how the brain response
changes as anticipatory imagery becomes stronger.
When people know fairly well what tune will follow a cue tune (i.e., during the first run), sequence
learning areas are fairly active. They also rate the
vividness of the upcoming target tune as being moderately vivid (a mean of 3.62 of 5). But when the
associations are recent and overlearned, less activity is shown in several areas, presumably because
the associations have already been formed. Vividness ratings go up (a mean of 4.01), and the relationship between the behavioral rating and signal strength in two areas associated with the task
becomes impressively fine tuned. Both types of
findings speak to the dynamic aspects of auditory
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imagery: the neural locus reflects what happens as
the anticipatory imagery becomes a more accurate
predictor of the upcoming information. Anticipation is likely one way that musicians calibrate their
timing when playing in an ensemble;16 here we
see that even small amounts of training can yield
some dramatic neural changes associated with that
mechanism.
From both sets of studies, we can draw some conclusions about both the construct of auditory imagery and the methods for studying it. First, it is
possible to devise tasks that externalize the essentially private experience of auditory imagery. Furthermore, we can capture time-locked aspects of
auditory imagery, which is important for studying imagery experiences that unfold over time. The
more obvious example of this was the ability of
the participants in the emotion study to track,
with exquisite temporal resolution, the moment-tomoment changes in rather complex imagined music. But even the simpler task of anticipating one
melody after hearing another one requires temporal
tracking.
We also saw that the dynamic aspect of imagery
can in some respects be reflected in short-term neural changes. The additional training in the Leaver et
al. study12 comprised a mere 10 minutes. Nevertheless, this was enough to engender clear differences
in neural response—in this case the reduction of response as the anticipation became more entrenched.
Finally, we saw remarkable correspondences in
self-report measures and neural patterns. As Zatorre reports in another paper in this Symposium,
self-report on an auditory imagery vividness scale
predicts response in auditory cortex and intraparietal sulcus during mental musical transformation
tasks. We might think of this as a relationship between a trait measure of auditory imagery and neural response, where overall stronger ability to imagine sounds predicts more activity. The trial-by-trial
vividness measure in the anticipatory imagery study
reflects more a state measure as participants judged
each particular instance of anticipation. We cannot
disentangle causality; we do not know if the ratings
engender the neural changes or vice versa. However,
we can say that the essentially linear relationship
between self-reported vividness and neural activity
suggests that these reports are psychologically robust. These results should encourage cognitive neuroscientists to include both objective and subjective
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behavioral measures as they probe complex mental
phenomena.
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